Financials
Financials — What the Numbers Say
Figures converted from KRW at historical FX rates — see data/company.json.fx_rates. Ratios, margins, and multiples are unitless and unchanged.
Mirae Corporation is a micro-cap Korean semiconductor test-handler maker (113 employees, ATE plus SMT plus linear motors) whose financials swing violently with one customer cycle. FY2025 revenue more than doubled year-on-year to $35.0 million, operating margin recovered to 18.0% and the company posted $7.0 million of net income — yet operating cash flow was negative $3.6 million and free cash flow was negative $15.2 million. The balance sheet still has more cash than debt, but the cash pile has shrunk from $32 million (FY2021) to $7.5 million, and the share count has nearly tripled since FY2022 to fund a heavy capex cycle. The stock trades at 6.1× earnings and 0.5× book, which looks cheap until you see that 56.5% of FY2025 revenue came from a single Chinese customer (YILINING PRECISION) and that reported earnings keep diverging from cash.
1. Financials in One Page
FY2025 Revenue ($M)
FY2025 Operating Margin
FY2025 Net Income ($M)
FY2025 Operating Cash Flow ($M)
FY2025 Free Cash Flow ($M)
FY2025 Net Cash Position ($M)
FY2025 ROIC
FY2025 P/E (year-end mkt cap)
FY2025 P/Book (year-end mkt cap)
Definitions for beginners. Revenue is sales. Operating margin is operating profit divided by revenue — a measure of profitability before interest and tax. Free cash flow (FCF) is operating cash flow minus capital expenditure — the cash a company actually has left after running the business and reinvesting. Net cash is cash minus debt; positive means the company could pay off all its borrowings and still have money left. ROIC (return on invested capital) measures the cash return earned on the capital invested in the business. P/E and P/Book are the share price divided by earnings per share and book value per share respectively — lower usually means cheaper.
The single financial metric that matters most right now is operating cash flow conversion. Reported earnings say recovery; the cash statement says the business is consuming cash. Whether Q1 FY2026's $3.2 million of operating income translates into actual cash over the rest of FY2026 will decide whether this stock is a re-rating story or an accounting mirage.
2. Revenue, Margins, and Earnings Power
Mirae's income statement is a textbook semiconductor-cycle whiplash chart. FY2021 and FY2022 were two consecutive strong years driven by memory test handler shipments. FY2023 was a disaster — revenue more than halved and a Q4 inventory writedown drove gross profit negative for the full year. FY2024 was a partial rebound. FY2025 returned to roughly FY2021 revenue scale.
The FY2024 gross margin of 83.3% is not a sign of pricing power — it is an accounting mirror image of FY2023's writedown. In Q4 FY2023, Mirae took $11.8 million of negative gross profit on just $2.0 million of revenue, almost entirely an inventory and asset impairment tied to the customer cycle collapse. Much of that was reversed when shipments resumed in FY2024, which mechanically inflated reported gross margin. The 41.8% gross margin in FY2025 is closer to the underlying through-cycle reality.
Recent quarterly trajectory
The quarterly chart shows why the stock has run hard since mid-2025: Q3 FY2025 was the standout, with $16.1 million of revenue (more than all of H1 FY2025 combined) and a 26.6% operating margin. Q1 FY2026 came in at $13.7 million — confirming that the ramp is sustaining.
Q3 FY2024's apparent 119% operating margin is the FY2023 writedown reversal mechanically flowing through one quarter; ignore it as a margin signal. The clean read is: from Q1 FY2025 onward, operating margin has held positive in every quarter — that is the first stretch of clean profitability since 2022.
The earnings recovery is real but cyclical and customer-driven. One Chinese customer (YILINING PRECISION) accounted for 56.5% of FY2025 revenue and the surge in ATE units sold (14 in FY2023, 23 in FY2024, 90 in FY2025) maps directly to that customer's ramp. Earnings power is not yet structural — it is one customer cycle.
3. Cash Flow and Earnings Quality
This is the section that should make a careful investor pause.
Free cash flow is cash generated after operating needs and capital expenditures. If reported net income exceeds cash earnings persistently, the gap usually shows up later as a writedown, an inventory build, or an equity raise to fund the gap. Mirae has all three patterns.
The pattern is uncomfortable. In four of the last five fiscal years, free cash flow has been either negative or modest. The headline $7.0 million of FY2025 net income converted to negative $3.6 million of operating cash flow, a gap of roughly $10.6 million that almost certainly sits in receivables (the customer ramp shipped late in the year) and in inventory build for FY2026. FY2024's near-zero OCF combined with $24.7 million of capex required $12.4 million of financing — most of which came from issuing new shares.
Major cash-flow distortions
| Item | FY2023 ($M) | FY2024 ($M) | FY2025 ($M) | What it reveals |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | 5.15 | 0.22 | -3.57 | Real cash collection has lagged reported profits for two years |
| Capex | -0.15 | -24.66 | -11.67 | A capacity build cycle ~10× revenue in FY2024 alone |
| Free cash flow | 5.00 | -24.44 | -15.24 | Two consecutive years of cash-burn even as earnings turned positive |
| Financing cash flow | 1.41 | 12.36 | 6.47 | Funded by share issuance and modest new long-term debt ($4.5M added in FY2025) |
| Stock-based comp | — | — | 0.17 | Small relative to dilution from issuance |
The cash flow statement says Mirae has been a cash-consuming, capital-raising story for the last two years, not a cash-compounding one — despite headline profits.
Earnings quality red flag: FY2025 reported $7.0 million of net income while operating cash flow was negative $3.6 million. The roughly $10.6 million gap is the gap an investor should watch. Until it closes — through receivables collection or inventory drawdown — accounting earnings overstate economic earnings.
4. Balance Sheet and Financial Resilience
Mirae's balance sheet is still defensible — equity is 80% of assets, total debt is small, and the company holds more cash than it owes. But the direction of travel is the wrong one: cash has fallen by 77% in four years and long-term debt appeared for the first time in FY2025.
Liquidity and working capital snapshot (FY2025)
| Line item | FY2024 ($M) | FY2025 ($M) | Read |
|---|---|---|---|
| Cash and equivalents | 9.18 | 7.50 | Down again, despite a "profitable" year |
| Current assets | 28.58 | 41.00 | Bulked up — likely receivables and inventory |
| Current liabilities | 13.81 | 13.49 | Stable |
| Long-term debt | 0.00 | 4.48 | First time on the balance sheet in this 5-year window |
| Shareholders' equity | 72.09 | 84.60 | Grew via retained earnings plus share issuance |
| Net cash (cash − debt) | 9.18 | 3.02 | Net cash buffer has thinned by two-thirds |
The current ratio of 3.04× looks comfortable, but the quick ratio of 1.17× shows that almost half of current assets are inventory — the riskiest asset on a cyclical handler maker's balance sheet because it depends on the next customer order to convert. Equity-to-assets of 80.5% is genuinely strong; this is not a leveraged company. But the cash position and the appearance of long-term debt warn that the financing slack is being used.
Resilience verdict: still investment-grade by structure (low leverage, high equity), but the cash buffer is roughly one quarter of revenue and the company has now begun to borrow. Another FY2023-style demand shock would be funded by either deeper debt or another equity raise, both of which destroy per-share value.
5. Returns, Reinvestment, and Capital Allocation
This is where the small print becomes the big story. Mirae has earned a positive ROE in four of the last five years — but the share count has nearly tripled to fund the capex cycle, so per-share returns have lagged.
Share count and dilution
Shares outstanding went from 1.66 million (FY2021) to 4.47 million (FY2025), a 169% increase. That is the cost of funding the FY2024 capex blow-out plus refilling the cash buffer after FY2023's loss year. There have been no buybacks and no meaningful dividends in this window — every dollar of capital returned has been injected, not returned.
Capital allocation (cumulative FY2021–FY2025, $ millions)
| Use of cash | Cumulative $M | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Capex | -39.4 | Heavy capacity expansion concentrated in FY2024 ($24.7M) |
| Net debt change | +4.5 | First long-term debt taken on in FY2025 |
| Equity issuance (net financing) | +32.0 | Funded the capex; explains the dilution |
| Dividends / buybacks | ~0 | No capital returned to shareholders |
| Operating cash generated | +6.2 | Five-year cumulative operating cash flow |
The cumulative scorecard says: Mirae has raised more outside capital in five years (~$36 million via equity and debt) than the business has generated organically (~$6 million). On a per-share basis, EPS in FY2025 ($1.47) is below FY2021's $4.10 even though net income is higher. That gap is the dilution tax.
Capital allocation read: management is reinvesting at uncertain returns (FY2025 ROIC of 7.88% is below most credible cost-of-capital estimates for a Korean micro-cap) while diluting equity holders. The FY2024 capex bet on capacity for the China ATE ramp is paying off in FY2025 shipments — but the per-share scorecard is unflattering.
6. Segment and Unit Economics
Mirae operates in two segments — ATE (test handlers, burn-in sorters) and SMT (chip mounters, linear motors). ATE has always carried the economics and FY2025 made that even more extreme.
Units shipped — the operational tell
| Metric | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| ATE units | 14 | 23 | 90 |
| ATE revenue ($M) | 4.53 | 8.11 | 25.05 |
| Implied ATE ASP ($M/unit) | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.28 |
| SMT units | 8 | 28 | 13 |
| SMT revenue ($M) | 0.67 | 2.47 | 1.10 |
| ATE factory utilization | n.a. | n.a. | 97.5% |
ATE unit volume grew ~6× year-on-year in FY2025; SMT shrank to less than half of FY2024 units. The story is overwhelmingly an ATE volume story — and within ATE, overwhelmingly one customer.
Geographic and customer concentration (FY2025)
| Customer | Country | Revenue ($M) | % of total |
|---|---|---|---|
| YILINING PRECISION | China | 19.80 | 56.5% |
| SK Hynix | South Korea | 4.36 | 12.5% |
| YMTC (Yangtze Memory) | China | 1.23 | 3.5% |
| MSV Systems | Singapore | 0.15 | 0.4% |
| All others | — | 9.50 | 27.1% |
| Total | 35.04 | 100.0% |
Export revenue is 80.1% of the total; China-linked customers (YILINING plus YMTC) alone are ~60% of revenue. Domestic Korea is only 19.9%.
Concentration risk is the single most important segment fact: one Chinese customer is more than half of revenue. A pause in YILINING orders — whether commercial, geopolitical (US export-control on Chinese memory equipment), or competitive — would cut Mirae's revenue in half overnight and likely produce another FY2023-style operating loss given the fixed-cost base.
7. Valuation and Market Expectations
The headline multiples on FY2025 close numbers look cheap. The current multiples, after a +169% one-year rally in the stock (price $18.22 on 21 May 2026, using period-end FX), are still modest — but the implied earnings the market is now paying for is roughly double last year's reported number.
Multiple history
Current snapshot (post-rally)
| Metric | FY2025 close (year-end mkt cap $42.6M) | Current (21 May 2026, mkt cap ~$81M) |
|---|---|---|
| P/E (on FY2025 NI $7.0M) | 6.1× | ~12.2× |
| P/Book (on equity $84.6M) | 0.50× | ~1.00× |
| EV/EBITDA (on FY2025 EBITDA $7.0M) | 5.8× | ~11.4× |
| P/Sales (on FY2025 revenue $35.0M) | 1.22× | ~2.4× |
Choice of metric. For a cyclical capital-equipment business that has just turned the cycle, EV/EBITDA and P/Book are more honest than P/E (since trough-year P/E is meaningless). Current EV/EBITDA in the low double digits is no longer a deep-value multiple — it is closer to peer-group average — and current P/B at ~1.0× is roughly fair for a business earning a 7.9% ROIC.
Quick bear / base / bull frame
| Scenario | Assumption | Implied FY2026 revenue ($M) | Implied FY2026 net income ($M) | Fair value vs today |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bear | YILINING orders halve, no offsetting customer | ~20 | -3 to 0 (loss) | down 40–60% |
| Base | FY2026 holds FY2025 scale plus modest growth; cash conversion improves | 40–46 | 8–10 | flat to up 15% |
| Bull | YILINING ramp continues, second large customer added, HBM exposure broadens via SK Hynix | 60+ | 14+ | up 50% or more |
The bull case requires customer diversification and clean operating cash flow conversion. Without both, the stock is asking the buyer to trust a single-customer story at near-peer multiples.
Valuation read: not "cheap" any more. Year-end FY2025 multiples were genuinely depressed; today's price already discounts continued strength. The stock is "fair to slightly demanding" relative to a 7.9% ROIC, single-customer revenue mix, and negative cash conversion. The reason it has rallied is the order-book momentum (multiple disclosed orders of $1.1–9.2M since November), not a fundamental re-rating of returns.
8. Peer Financial Comparison
The natural peer set is Korean test-equipment names (Techwing, Hanmi Semiconductor, ISC) plus the two western/Japanese benchmarks (Advantest, Cohu). Numbers are FY2025 close, converted to USD (Advantest's fiscal year ends 31 March; FY2026 figure shown for its just-reported year).
Note on currency. All figures restated in US dollars at period-end FX rates. Advantest's fiscal year ends in March; FY26 figures are its year ended 31 March 2026.
The peer gap that matters. Mirae's operating margin (18.0%) and ROIC (7.9%) sit between the cyclical loss-making Cohu and the cash-printing duo of HANMI Semiconductor and Advantest. The two profitable Korean peers (HANMI, ISC) earn 27–44% operating margins and 25–45% ROIC because they sit in structurally favourable niches (HBM TC bonders, test sockets) with pricing power. Mirae sells a more commoditised handler product, and its returns reflect that. The valuation discount to those peers (Mirae trades roughly in line with Techwing on P/E, but at a fraction of HANMI's revenue multiple) is deserved, not a market mistake — the question for the bull is whether the FY2025–FY2026 customer cycle changes the structural earnings profile or just produces one strong cycle.
9. What to Watch in the Financials
| Metric | Why it matters | Latest value | Better | Worse | Where to check |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Operating cash flow | Tests whether reported earnings are real | -$3.6M (FY2025) | turns positive in FY2026 | stays negative two more quarters | cash flow statement |
| Receivables and inventory days | Where the $10.6M earnings/cash gap is sitting | not disclosed quarterly | both drop in Q2–Q3 FY2026 | both keep climbing | balance sheet schedules |
| YILINING PRECISION revenue share | Single largest concentration risk | 56.5% of FY2025 | drops toward 30–40% as other customers ramp | climbs above 60% | DART business report top-customer disclosure |
| Capex run-rate | Tells whether the FY2024 build cycle is done | $11.7M (FY2025) | falls to $3–6M in FY2026 | another $20M+ year | cash flow statement |
| Share count | Dilution risk if FCF stays negative | 4.47M (FY2025) | flat through FY2026 | new equity raise | quarterly filings |
| Operating margin | Earnings quality through the cycle | 18.0% (FY2025) | holds at 15–20% across all FY2026 quarters | drops to 10% as mix shifts | quarterly income statement |
| Long-term debt | Liquidity slack | $4.5M (FY2025) | flat or repaid | grows past $15M | balance sheet |
What the financials confirm. Mirae is profitable again, the FY2023 disaster has been worked through, and order momentum is strong enough to sustain FY2026.
What the financials contradict. The headline earnings strength is not yet showing up in cash. Two consecutive years of free-cash-flow burn while the company raises equity is the opposite of what a high-quality compounder looks like. The stock's +169% rally already prices in a clean cycle.
The first financial metric to watch is operating cash flow conversion in the Q2 FY2026 filing. If reported earnings of roughly $3–4 million per quarter convert to positive operating cash flow without further equity issuance, this is a re-rating story. If the cash gap widens — receivables or inventory keep building — the earnings recovery will look more like the FY2024 mirror image of FY2023's writedown than a sustainable compounding business.